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Turing’smodel of themind
Mark Sprevak
University of Edinburgh
17 January 2014
Alan Turing contributed to a revolutionary idea: that mental activity is, at root,
computation. Turing’s work helped lay the foundation for what is now known
as cognitive science. Today, computation is an essential element for explaining
how themind works. heHuman Brain Project, a giant European science project,
recently awarded one billion euros, aims to understand themind using this idea.¹
In this chapter, I return to Turing’s early attempts to understanding themind using
computation. I examine the role Turing played in the early days of cognitive science.
1 Engineering versus psychology
Turing is famous as a founding ûgure in Artiûcial Intelligence, but his contribution
to cognitive science is less well known. John McCarthy, who coined the term
Artiûcial Intelligence (AI) in 1955, deûned it as ‘the science and engineering ofmaking
intelligent machines’. Turing was one of the ûrst people to carry out research in this
area, working on machine intelligence as early as 1941, and as Chapter 26 explained,
he was responsible for, or anticipated,many of the ideas that were later to shape AI.
Cognitive science, unlike AI, does not aim to create an intelligent machine. Cognit-
ive science aims instead to understand themechanisms that are peculiar to human
cognition. On the face of it, human intelligence seems miraculous. How do we
reason, understand language, remember past events, come up with a joke? It is hard
1. See http://www.humanbrainproject.eu.
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to know how even to begin to explain these phenomena. Yet, like amagic trick that
seems miraculous to the audience, but which is explained by revealing the pulleys
and levers behind the stage, so human intelligence could potentially be explained if
we knew themechanisms that lie behind its production. A ûrst step in this direction
is to examine a piece ofmachinery that is usually hidden from view: the human
brain. A challenge that then immediately confronts one is the human brain’s aston-
ishingly complexity. he human brain is one of the most complex objects in the
universe. It contains a hundred billion neurons, and amind-bogglingly complex
web of close to a quadrillion connections. Trying to uncover themechanisms of
human intelligence by looking at the brain is impossible unless one has an idea what
to look for. Which properties of the brain are relevant to producing intelligence?
One of the guiding, andmost fruitful, assumptions in cognitive science is that the
relevant property of the brain for producing intelligence is the computation that the
brain performs.
Cognitive science and AI are closely related: both concern human intelligence
and both use computation. It is important to see, however, that the two ûelds are
distinct. AI aims to create an intelligent machine that may, or may not, use the
samemechanisms as humans. Cognitive science aims to uncover themechanisms
peculiar to human intelligence. he two projects may work in tandem, but they
need not. Consider that if one aims to create a hovering machine, it is not necessary
to also solve the problem of how birds and insects hover; today, more than 100
years aer the ûrst helicopter ight, it is still not fully understood how birds and
insects hover. Similarly, if one aims to create an intelligent machine, one need not,
at least in principle, explain how humans are intelligent. Onemight be sanguine
about the former project, but pessimistic about the latter. For example, onemight
think that engineering an intelligent machine is doable, but that themechanisms of
human intelligence are too messy and complex for us ever to understand. Or, one
might think that human intelligence, although messy and complex, can at least be
investigated experimentally and is in broad outline explicable, but that building an
intelligent machine depends on details that are too complex for engineers ever to
master. In Turing’s day, optimism reigned for AI, and the cognitive-science project
took a backseat. Fortunes have now reversed. FewAI researchers aim at creating the
kind of general intelligence that Turing envisioned. In contrast, cognitive science
today is a highly promising research program and funded to the tune of billions of
dollars as initiatives like theHuman Brain Project show.
Cognitive science and Artiûcial Intelligence divide roughly along the lines of psy-
chology and engineering. Cognitive science aims to understand how the human
brain produces intelligence; AI aims to engineer an intelligent machine. Turing’s
contribution to the engineering project is well known. What did Turing contribute
to the cognitive-science project? Did Turing intend his computational models as
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psychological theories as well as engineering strategy?
2 Building brainy computers
Turing rarely discussed psychology directly in his work. here is good evidence,
however, that Turing saw computational models as shedding light on human psy-
chology as well as a solution to the engineering problem of building an intelligent
machine.
Turing was fascinated by the idea of building a brain-like computer. Turing’s B-
machines were inspired by his attempt to reproduce the action of the brain, as
described in Chapter 30. Turing talked about his desire to build a machine to
‘imitate a brain’, to ‘mimic the behaviour of the human computer’, ‘to take aman . . .
and to try to replace . . . parts of him bymachinery . . . [with] some sort of “electronic
brain”’. Turing claimed that ‘it is not altogether unreasonable to describe digital
computers as brains’, that ‘our main problem [is] how to programme amachine to
imitate a brain’.²
Evidently, Turing thought the tasks of engineering and psychology were related. But
what did Turing think was the nature of their relationship? We should distinguish
three diòerent things that Turing might have intended.
First, psychology sets standards for engineering success. Human behaviour is where
our grasp on the notion of intelligence starts. Intelligent behaviour is, in the ûrst
instance, known to us as something that humans do. One thing that psychology
provides us with is a speciûcation of intelligent human behaviour. his description
can then be used in the service of AI by providing a benchmark for the behaviour
of intelligent machines. Whether amachine counts as intelligent depends on how
well it meets an appropriately idealised version of standards speciûed by psychology.
Psychology is relevant to AI here because psychology speciûes what is meant by
intelligent behaviour. his connection seems peculiar to intelligent behaviour. One
could, for instance, understand what hovering is perfectly well without knowledge
of birds or insects.
Second, psychology as a source of inspiration for engineering. We know that thehuman
brain produces intelligent behaviour. One way to tackle the engineering project
is to examine the human brain. It is common for engineering to take inspiration
from nature. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that the being-inspired-by
relation is relatively weak one. Someonemay be inspired by a natural designwithout
understanding, or having a worked-out view about, how that design works. For
2. Turing (2004b), p. 484; Turing (2004c), p. 445; Turing (2004d), p. 420; Turing (2004b), p. 482;
Turing (2004d), p. 472.
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example, someone impressed by how birds ymay add wings to an artiûcial ying
machine. But even if this design proves fruitful, that does not mean the engineer
knows how a bird’s wings enable it to y. he way in which a wing allows a bird to
y may not be the same as the way in which wing allows the engineer’s artiûcial
machine to y—apping, for example, may be essential part of the operation in
one case but not the other. An engineer may take inspiration from brains without
commitment to a computational view on how brains work.
hird, psychology should explain human intelligence in terms of the brain’s compu-
tational mechanisms. Unlike the two previous claims, this claim does involve a
commitment to the cognitive-science project. If this claim is right, themechanisms
of human thought are computational, and psychology should explain human intel-
ligence in terms of computational mechanisms. he two claims above, although
compatible with this claim, do not entail it. Indeed, the two claims above are silent
about what psychology should, or should not, do. hey only describe a one-sided
interaction between psychology and engineering: psychology sets the standards
of engineering success, or psychology inspires engineering. he cognitive-science
claim is diòerent. It recommends that psychology should be changed by the com-
putational framework employed by the engineering project. he way in which we
explain human cognition, as well as attempts to artiûcially simulate it, should be
based on computational mechanisms.
Did Turing make the cognitive-science claim? Turing’s work certainly has a great
deal of aõnity with this claim and, as we will see in the next section, his work has
been used by others in the service of that claim. Turing himself appears to come
close to asserting the cognitive-science claim at a number of points.
In his statements above, Turing describes an important strategy forAI: imitating the
brain’s mechanisms in an electronic computer. In order for such a strategy to work,
one has to know the relevant properties of the brain for generating intelligence;
otherwise, one would not know which aspects of the brain to reproduce. As Turing
says, the relevant features are not that ‘the brain has the consistency of cold porridge’
or the ûne-grained electrical properties of nerves.³ he relevant feature, according
to Turing, is the brain’s ability ‘to transmit information from place to place, and
also to store it’;4 Turing says that ‘brains very nearly fall into [the class of electronic
computers], and there seems to be every reason to believe that they could have been
made to fall genuinely into it without any change in their essential properties.’5 he
essential properties of the brain for producing intelligence are, consequently, its
computational properties. hese are the properties responsible for human intelligent
3. Turing (2004a), p. 495; Turing (2004d), p. 420.
4. Turing (2004d), p. 420.
5. Turing (2004d), p. 412.
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behaviour. On the face of it, this still has the avour of a one-way interaction
between engineering and psychology: which features of the brain are relevant to
engineering? But unlike the two claims above, this one-way interaction presupposes
a deûnite view on how the human brain works: the brain produces intelligent
behaviour via its computational properties. his is precisely the cognitive-science
claim. Turing appears, therefore, to be committed to the cognitive-science claim via
his engineering strategy.
here is a problem, however. he key terms that Turing uses—‘reproduce’, ‘imitate’,
‘mimic’, ‘simulate’—have a special meaning in Turing’s work that pulls against the
reading above. hese terms can either have a strong or aweak reading. On the strong
reading, reproducing, imitating,mimicking, or simulating a system means ‘copying
that system’s inner workings’—copying the equivalent to the levers and pulleys
by which the system achieves its behaviour. On the weak reading, reproducing,
imitating,mimicking, or simulating means only ‘copying the system’s overall input–
output behaviour’—reproducing the behaviour of the system, but not necessarily the
system’s particular tricks for doing so. he strong reading requires that an ‘imitation’
of a brain work in the same way as a brain; the weak reading requires only that an
‘imitation’ of a brain produce equivalent behaviour and be capable of solving the
same tasks.
We assumed the strong reading above: for Turing to imitate, mimic, or simulate
a human brain, he needed to make an assumption about how the human brain
works. However, in Turing’s work, he tended to use these terms primarily in their
weak sense. Indeed, exclusive use of the weak sense is required in order to prove
the computational results concerning the power of computers that Turing is most
famous for, as we will see in the next section. If the weak sense of these terms is
the correct one, then the interpretation above is not correct. Imitating a brain does
not require knowing how brains work, only knowing which tasks brains solve. he
latter falls squarely under the ûrst relationship between psychology and engineering:
psychology sets standards for engineering success. Imitating a brain—in the weak
sense of reproducing the brain’s overall input–output behaviour—only requires
psychology to specify the input–output behaviour that AI should aim to reproduce.
It does not require that one accept the cognitive-science claim.
Is there evidence that Turing favoured the cognitive-science claim over the weak
reading? Turing wrote to the psychologist W. Ross Ashby:
In working on the ACE I am more interested in the possibility of pro-
ducing models of the action of the brain than in practical applications
to computing. . . . hus, although the brain may in fact operate by chan-
ging its neuron circuits by the growth of axons and dendrites, we could
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nevertheless make amodel, within the ACE, in which this possibility
was allowed for, but inwhich the actual construction of the ACE did not
alter, but only the remembered data, describing themode of behaviour
applicable at any time.6
his appears to show that Turing endorsed the cognitive-science claim: he believed
that the computational properties of the brain are those that are essential to its
operation in producing intelligent behaviour. Unfortunately, it is also dogged by
the same problem we saw above. Producing a computational model can be given
either a strong or weak reading. It could either mean producing amodel that works
in the same way as the brain (strong), or amodel that merely has the same overall
behavioural proûle (weak). Both kinds of computational model would be of interest
to Turing and Ashby. Only the former would tell in favour of the cognitive-science
project.
Tantalisingly, Turing ûnished his 1951 BBC radio broadcast with:
he whole thinking process is still rather mysterious to us, but I believe
that the attempt to make a thinking machine will help us greatly in
ûnding out how we think ourselves.7
he diõculty here is that the helping relation, like the being-inspired-by relation, is
not speciûc enough to pin down the cognitive-science claim. here are innumerable
ways in which the engineering project could help psychology: themachines created
by the engineering project may facilitate psychological enquiry, the engineering
project may teach us high-level principles that apply to all intelligent systems, the
engineering project maymotivate psychology to give a clear speciûcation of human
competences. None of these are the same as the cognitive-science claim.
Turing’s writings are certainly consistent with the cognitive-science claim, and it
may be natural to read that claim into his work. However, it is worth noting that
his writings do not oòer unambiguous support for this. In the next section, we will
see a clearer form of inuence Turing had on modern-day cognitive science. We
will see how Turing’s computational models were taken up by others and used as
psychological models.
6. Letter from Turing to W. Ross Ashby, no date (Woodger papers (catalogue refer-
ence M11/99); a digital facsimile is in the Turing Archive for the History of Computing
[www.alanturing.net/turing_ashby].
7. Turing (2004b), p. 486.
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3 Frommathematics to psychology
Turing proposed many computational models that have inuenced psychology.
Here I will focus only on the most famous of these models, the Turing machine.
Turing devised the Turing machine as amathematical abstraction of rule-governed
behaviour. Ostensibly the purpose of the Turing machine was to settle questions in
mathematical logic, in particular, the question ofwhichmathematical statements can
and cannot be proven by mechanical means. What we will see in this section is that
Turing’s model was good for another purpose: it could also be used in psychology
as amodel of human thought. his spin-oò from Turing’s mathematical work was
extremely inuential. While the Turing machine and its role in mathematical logic
are described in Part 2 of this book, here we focus on the Turing machine’s role in
psychology.
A Turing machine is amathematical abstraction of a human clerk. Suppose that
such a human works ‘mechanically’, without intelligence or insight, to solve amath-
ematical problem. Turing asks us to compare this ‘to amachine that is only capable
of a ûnite number of conditions’.8 hat machine, a Turing machine, has a ûnite
number of internal states and an unlimited length of blank tape divided into squares
on which it can write and erase symbols. At anymoment, the Turing machine can
read a symbol from its tape, write a symbol, erase a symbol,move to neighbouring
square, or change its internal state. he Turing machine’s behaviour is ûxed by its
ûnite set of instructions (‘table’) that speciûes what it should do next (read, write,
erase symbol, change state) when it reads a symbol and when it is in a particular
state. Turing showed how to reason mathematically about the properties of Tur-
ing machines and how to prove results about the tasks that they can and cannot
accomplish.
Turing wanted to know which tasks could be performed by a human clerk working
mechanically. Could such a clerk, given enough time and paper, calculate any num-
ber? Could such a clerk, given enough time and paper, prove any truemathematical
statement? Answering these questions in the abstract is hard; indeed, it is diõcult to
know where to begin. Turing’s brilliance was to see that these seemingly intractable
questions can be answered ifwe replace themwith questions about Turingmachines.
If one could show that the problems that can be solved by Turing machines are the
same as the problems that can be solved by a human clerk, then any result about the
power of Turing machines would automatically carry over to human clerks. Turing
machines are proxies for human clerks in our mathematical reasoning.
It is relatively straightforward to show that the problems that a Turing machine can
solve can also be solved by a human clerk. he human clerk, given enough time
8. Turing (2004e), p. 59.
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and paper, could simply step through the operation of the Turing machine by hand.
he converse claim—problems that a human clerk can solve can also be solved
by a Turing machine—is harder to establish. Turing oòered a powerful informal
argument for this claim. Signiûcantly for our purposes, his argument depended on
psychological reasoning about how the human clerk’s mind works:
he behaviour of the [clerk] at anymoment is determined by the sym-
bols which he is observing, and his ‘state of mind’ at that moment.
Wemay suppose that there is a bound B to the number of symbols or
squares that the [clerk] can observe at onemoment. If he wishes to ob-
servemore, hemust use successive observations. We will also suppose
that the number of states ofmind which need be taken into account
is ûnite. he reasons for this are of the same character as those which
restrict the number of symbols. If we admitted an inûnity of states of
mind, some of them will be ‘arbitrarily close’ and will be confused.9
In thisway, Turing argued that the clerk cannot bring anymore internal resources to
bear in solving a problem than a Turing machine. Hence, the class of problems that
a clerk can solve can be no larger than those of a Turing machine. his is enough to
establish his required claim that the problems that can be solved by Turing machines
are the same as the problems that can be solved by a human clerk.
Turing’s argument is a crucial exercise in what we called ‘weak’ modelling. Turing’s
aim was to show that Turing machines and human clerks solve the same class of
problems. his only requires showing that a Turing machine mimics the input–
output behaviour of a clerk (‘weak modelling’), not that the Turing machine copies
the clerk’s peculiar internal mechanisms for doing so (‘strong modelling’). he
strong-modelling claim goes beyond what is required by Turing’s 1936 paper, and
Turing made no attempt to establish it. Onemight conclude from all this weak mod-
elling that there is nothing of great interest here for psychology. Yet, the argument
above should give one pause for thought. Turing’s argument requires human clerks
and Turing machines share at least some similarity in their inner working. hey
must have similar kinds of internal resources, otherwise Turing’s argument that the
clerk’s resources do not diòer in kind from those of a Turing machine would not
work. hat may lead one to wonder whether a Turing machine could bemore than
a weak model of a human. Perhaps a Turing machine also provides a description of
the clerk’s inner workings. In addition to capturing the clerk’s outward behaviour,
perhaps Turing machines also model the ‘levers and pulleys’ behind the clerk’s
behaviour. If correct, this would mean that Turing machines would not just be
useful to mathematical logic, but also to psychology.
9. Turing (2004e), pp. 75–76.
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4 Your brain’s inner Turing machine
So does a Turing machine provide a psychologically-realisticmodel of the inner
workings of a human clerk? Turing never pursued this question, but it has been
taken up by others. Most notably, the philosopherHilary Putnam argued that Turing
machines are an accurate psychological model of the workings of the human mind.
Putnam claimed that a Turing machine is not only a goodmodel of the clerk’s rule-
governed problem-solving behaviour, aTuringmachine is a goodmodel of all mental
life.¹0 According to Putnam, all mental states (beliefs, desires, thoughts, imaginings,
feelings, pains) should be understood as states of a Turing machine and its tape.
Mental process involving these states (reasoning, association, remembering) should
be understood as computational steps of that inner Turing machine. Psychological
explanation should take the formof explanation in terms of the nature and operation
of your inner Turing machine. Only once one sees the brain as implementing a
Turing machine can one correctly see the contribution that the brain makes to
our mental life. Putnam’s proposal falls neatly under the cognitive-science claim
identiûed above.
he context in which Putnam’s model was proposed was quite diòerent to that in
psychology today. At the time, there was a lack of any kind of computational model
of the human mind. he best account of the ‘levers and pulleys’ of our mental life
was assumed to lie in the complex nitty-gritty of physiology—the particular details
of physical brain processes—rather than in their computational properties. Putnam’s
target was a non-computational form of psychology. However, Putnam and others
quickly became dissatisûed with the Turing machine as amodel of human cognitive
mechanisms.¹¹ It is not hard to see why Turing machines are not psychologically
realistic. he human brain lacks any clear functional equivalent to a ‘tape’ or ‘head’,
human mental states are not monolithic entities that change in a serial, step-wise
way over time, and human psychology appears to involve diòerent mechanisms
that cooperate or compete with each other rather than a single mechanism that
inexorably unfolds. If themind is computational, it is unlikely that its computational
architecture is that of a Turing machine.
he past ûy years have seen an explosion in the number, and sophistication, of
computational models of themind. Today, state-of-the-art computational models
are a far cry from Turing machines. Among themost popular current models are
hierarchical recurrent connectionist networks that make probabilistic predictions
and implement Bayesian inference.¹² hese probabilistic computational structures
10. Putnam (1975b, 1975d).
11. Putnam (1975c).
12. Clark (2013).
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bear little resemblance in their inner working to Turing machines. Yet, onemight
still wonder if there is something essentially correct about Turing machines as a
psychological model. Even if the Turing machine is not an accuratemodel of all
aspects of our mental processing as Putnam had hoped, perhaps it nevertheless
provides an accuratemodel of some limited portion of our mental life.
Current thinking is that Turing machines do provide a good psychological model of
at least one aspect of our mental life: our conscious, serial, rule-governed thinking.
his is precisely themechanism atwork in cases like that of the human clerk. In these
cases, a human deliberately tries to arrange her mental processes to work in a rule-
governed, serial way; she attempts to follow rules without using initiative, insight
or ingenuity, and without being disturbed by her other mental processes. In these
situations, it seems that human’s psychological mechanisms do approximate those of
a Turing machine: mental states appear as a single entity and change in a serial, step-
wise fashion, and can be described as being governed by a single process rather than
by competing mechanisms. At a ûner level of detail—moving closer to the details
of the brain—there aremore complex and ûner-grained computational stories to
tell. Yet, as a high-level computational model, the Turing machine nevertheless still
is useful to psychology. In certain contexts, and at least on some level, our brains
implement a Turing machine. One way in which this result has been conveyed is
that a Turing machine runs as a virtual machine on the human brain.¹³
Modern computational models of themind, such as those described above, tend
to bemassively parallel, exhibit complex and delicate dynamics, and operate with
probability distributions rather than discrete symbols. hese computational models
fare wonderfully at explaining unconscious mental processing. hey also closely
resemble the low-level computational details of the brain. In contrast, the Turing-
machinemodel fares well at explaining conscious, serial, rule-governed, thinking,
despite being quite distant from a brain-like architecture. Promising current re-
search aims to bridge the gap between the two models and connect high-level
Turing-machine description with the low-level computational architecture of the
brain.¹4 he general idea is that a Turing-machine arises naturally, as an emergent
phenomenon, out of the action of low-level brain processes. An analogy could
be drawn with an electronic PC: a high-level computational architecture (C# or
Java) arises as an emergent phenomenon out of the joint action of a low-level
computational architecture (assembler or microcode). Both low and high levels of
computational description are important to explain diòerent aspects of an electronic
device’s behaviour. It is therefore not surprising that psychology would continue
to use both high-level Turing-machine-style description and low-level brain-like
description in order to explain human behaviour.
13. See Dennett (1991).
14. Feldman (2012); Zylberberg et al. (2011).
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In a rapidly-evolving ûeld like cognitive science onemight have guessed that by now
Turing’s computational models would have been discarded. Remarkably, this is not
the case. Not only are Turing’s general theoretical insights about computation intact,
but,more extraordinary, Turing’s speciûc computational models are regarded as
fundamentally correct as a psychological description albeit in a limited domain. Tur-
ing machines provide a valuable high-level model of serial, rule-governed, thought
processes. he Turing machine lives on in today’s cognitive science as a virtual
machine implemented on the human brain.
5 Conclusion
Turing has had a huge inuence on cognitive science. But, as we have seen, tracing
the precise course of his inuence is complex. In this chapter, we looked at two
possible sources: Turing’s own discussion of how psychology should be conducted,
and the way in which Turing’s computational models have been used by others. On
the ûrst score, we saw that Turing rarely talked explicitly about how psychology
should be conducted, and that it is not easy to attribute to Turing themodern-day
cognitive-science claim based on his writings alone. On the second score—how
Turing’s computational writings have been used by others—a clearer picture of
inuence emerged. Turing’s inuential 1936 paper made it natural to ask whether
the ‘weak’ computational modelling of humans that Turing established would lend
itself to the ‘strong’ modelling of psychology. his idea, taken up by Putnam and
others, remains inuential today. Turing’s legacy for cognitive science is immensely
rich and complex; it is impossible to survey in its entirety here. An important
part of that legacy, however, is that Turing machines capture a fundamental, and
long-lasting, insight about the working of the human mind.
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